Oligopoly

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An oligopoly is a market form in which a market or industry is dominated by a small number of sellers (oligopolists). The word is derived, by analogy with "monopoly", from the Greek ὀλίγοι (oligoi) "few" + πόλειν (pólein) "to sell". (Wikipedia.org)






Conferences related to Oligopoly

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2019 IEEE 15th International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE)

The conference is the primary forum for cross-industry and multidisciplinary research in automation. Its goal is to provide a broad coverage and dissemination of foundational research in automation among researchers, academics, and practitioners.


2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

The CDC is recognized as the premier scientific and engineering conference dedicated to the advancement of the theory and practice of systems and control. The CDC annually brings together an international community of researchers and practitioners in the field of automatic control to discuss new research results, perspectives on future developments, and innovative applications relevant to decision making, systems and control, and related areas.The 58th CDC will feature contributed and invited papers, as well as workshops and may include tutorial sessions.The IEEE CDC is hosted by the IEEE Control Systems Society (CSS) in cooperation with the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM), the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), the Japanese Society for Instrument and Control Engineers (SICE), and the European Union Control Association (EUCA).


2019 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (SMC)

2019 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC2019) will be held in the south of Europe in Bari, one of the most beautiful and historical cities in Italy. The Bari region’s nickname is “Little California” for its nice weather and Bari's cuisine is one of Italian most traditional , based of local seafood and olive oil. SMC2019 is the flagship conference of the IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society. It provides an international forum for researchers and practitioners to report up-to-the-minute innovations and developments, summarize state­of-the-art, and exchange ideas and advances in all aspects of systems science and engineering, human machine systems and cybernetics. Advances have importance in the creation of intelligent environments involving technologies interacting with humans to provide an enriching experience, and thereby improve quality of life.


2019 IEEE Milan PowerTech

PowerTech is the IEEE PES anchor conference in Europe and has been attended by hundreds of delegates from around the world. It will be an international forum with programme for individuals working in industry and academia, to network, exchange ideas, and discuss the results of their research and development work.

  • 2017 IEEE Manchester PowerTech

    this is IEEE PES anchor conference in Europe covering all areas of electrical power engineering

  • 2015 IEEE Eindhoven PowerTech

    This conference will continue the tradition of the PowerTech conferences held in odd years in Athens, Stockholm, Budapest, Porto, Bologna, St. Petersburg, Lausanne, Bucharest, Trondheim and Grenoble.PowerTech is the anchor conference of the IEEE Power Engineering Society in Europe. It is intended to provide a forum, in the European geographical area, for scientists and engineers interested in electric power engineering to exchange ideas, results of their scientific work, to learn from each other as well as to establish new friendships and rekindle existing ones. Student participation in Power Tech provides an important ingredient toward the event’s success: a special award, the Basil Papadias Award, is presented to the author of the best student paper at each edition. The Power Engineering Society of IEEE organized similar conferences in other parts of the world, such as PowerCon, in the Asia-Pacific region.

  • 2013 IEEE Grenoble PowerTech

    PowerTech is the anchor conference of the IEEE Power & Energy Society in Europe. It is intended to provide a forum for electric power engineering scientists and engineers to share ideas, results of their scientific work, to learn from each other as well as to establish new friendships and maintain existing ones.

  • 2011 IEEE Trondheim PowerTech

    PowerTech is the anchor conference of the IEEE Power & Energy Society in Europe. It is intended to provide a forum for electric power engineering scientists and engineers to share ideas, results of their scientific work and to learn from each other.

  • 2009 IEEE Bucharest Power Tech

    PowerTech is the anchor conference of the IEEE-PES in Europe. It is intended to provide a forum for scientists and engineers interested in electric power engineering to share ideas, results of their scientific work, to learn from each other as well as to establish new friendships and rekindle existing ones.

  • 2007 IEEE Power Tech

  • 2005 IEEE Russia Power Tech

  • 2003 Bologna Power Tech


2019 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

The Annual IEEE PES General Meeting will bring together over 2900 attendees for technical sessions, administrative sessions, super sessions, poster sessions, student programs, awards ceremonies, committee meetings, tutorials and more


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Periodicals related to Oligopoly

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Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on

The theory, design and application of Control Systems. It shall encompass components, and the integration of these components, as are necessary for the construction of such systems. The word `systems' as used herein shall be interpreted to include physical, biological, organizational and other entities and combinations thereof, which can be represented through a mathematical symbolism. The Field of Interest: shall ...


Communications Letters, IEEE

Covers topics in the scope of IEEE Transactions on Communications but in the form of very brief publication (maximum of 6column lengths, including all diagrams and tables.)


Computer

Computer, the flagship publication of the IEEE Computer Society, publishes peer-reviewed technical content that covers all aspects of computer science, computer engineering, technology, and applications. Computer is a resource that practitioners, researchers, and managers can rely on to provide timely information about current research developments, trends, best practices, and changes in the profession.


Computers, IEEE Transactions on

Design and analysis of algorithms, computer systems, and digital networks; methods for specifying, measuring, and modeling the performance of computers and computer systems; design of computer components, such as arithmetic units, data storage devices, and interface devices; design of reliable and testable digital devices and systems; computer networks and distributed computer systems; new computer organizations and architectures; applications of VLSI ...


Control Systems Magazine, IEEE

The magazine covers theory, analysis, design (computer-aided design), and practical implementation of circuits, and the application of circuit theoretic techniques to systems and to signal processing. Content is written for the spectrum of activities from basic scientific theory to industrial applications.


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Most published Xplore authors for Oligopoly

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Xplore Articles related to Oligopoly

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A game theory analysis of international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance

2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference, 2009

The mechanism of cooperative and the reputation model of strategic alliance are adopted in the game theory analysis of the international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance, which proves that the international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance is a cooperative game process based on some common interests, and that the strategic alliance is stable under the condition of the severe unbalance ...


Study on hotel revenue management without explicitly incorporating competition

2016 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), 2016

This paper analyzes the possibility of applying model that is not explicitly incorporate competition in hotel Revenue Management. Three scenarios are evaluated; (i) each seller understands how its own price affects its own demand but does not directly account for how its competitor's price does, (ii) each seller knows the total market size, and tries to learn how its own ...


Game analysis of cooperative advertising based on "one to many" supply chain model

2010 7th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, 2010

Although the cooperative advertising has been discussed for several years. But the existed results are single supplier to single vendor case. This paper aims to extend the cooperative advertising problem to single supplier to many competitive vendors. Consider the demand of vendors is influenced not only the vendors' but also the competitors' advertising input, based on the mechanism of single ...


The long-term impact of wind power on electricity prices and generating capacity

2011 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2011

This paper uses a market equilibrium model to calculate how the mix of generating capacity would change if large amounts of intermittent renewables are built in Great Britain, and what this means for operating patterns and the distribution of prices over time. The model is calibrated to 2020 data for wind and demand (from Green and Vasilakos, Energy Policy, 2010) ...


Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

2012 IEEE 4th International Conference on Nonlinear Science and Complexity (NSC), 2012

We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also ...


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Educational Resources on Oligopoly

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IEEE.tv Videos

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IEEE-USA E-Books

  • A game theory analysis of international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance

    The mechanism of cooperative and the reputation model of strategic alliance are adopted in the game theory analysis of the international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance, which proves that the international iron ore manufacturers strategic alliance is a cooperative game process based on some common interests, and that the strategic alliance is stable under the condition of the severe unbalance of international iron ore supply and demand as well as high monopolization.

  • Study on hotel revenue management without explicitly incorporating competition

    This paper analyzes the possibility of applying model that is not explicitly incorporate competition in hotel Revenue Management. Three scenarios are evaluated; (i) each seller understands how its own price affects its own demand but does not directly account for how its competitor's price does, (ii) each seller knows the total market size, and tries to learn how its own price affects demand, while failing to directly account for the effect of its competitor's prices, and (iii) the seller has no information regarding parameters of demand model. The demand is considered as stochastic. The result shows that the model that does not incorporate competition explicitly is only representative for the short-run market response. However, oligopoly model still gives better results.

  • Game analysis of cooperative advertising based on "one to many" supply chain model

    Although the cooperative advertising has been discussed for several years. But the existed results are single supplier to single vendor case. This paper aims to extend the cooperative advertising problem to single supplier to many competitive vendors. Consider the demand of vendors is influenced not only the vendors' but also the competitors' advertising input, based on the mechanism of single supplier to many competitive vendors, and come to three main conclusions based on “one to many” supply chain model.

  • The long-term impact of wind power on electricity prices and generating capacity

    This paper uses a market equilibrium model to calculate how the mix of generating capacity would change if large amounts of intermittent renewables are built in Great Britain, and what this means for operating patterns and the distribution of prices over time. The model is calibrated to 2020 data for wind and demand (from Green and Vasilakos, Energy Policy, 2010) with costs from Mott MacDonald's 2010 report to the Department of Energy and Climate Change. If generators bid their marginal costs, we find that the changes to the capacity mix are much greater than the changes to the pattern of prices. Thermal capacity falls only slightly in response to the extra wind capacity, and there is a shift towards power stations with higher variable costs (but lower fixed costs). The changes to the pattern of prices, once capacity has adjusted, are relatively small. This is because each type of capacity needs to cover its costs from its market revenues, and so average prices over the period for which it operates must equal the average level of those costs. In an optimal system, the amounts of each type of capacity are chosen so that stations are operating for the number of hours for which they have lower costs than alternative station types. The number of each type of station needed to achieve this depends on the load-duration curve, and so when this changes, so does the optimal capacity mix. The load factors that each station will achieve, given the optimal capacity mix, will not change very much, since they are constrained by the need for the stations only to run for the number of hours for which they are the cheapest option. With similar load factors, the station's average costs will not change very much, and so the average revenue required over a given part of the load-duration curve will also change little. In an oligopolistic setting, strategic generators will choose lower levels of capacity, although they will still want a cost-minimizing capacity mix, given their patterns of operation. If wind output does not receive the market price, then mark-ups on thermal generation will be lower in a system with large amounts of wind power, since the generators will have less incentive to raise their prices for the lower amount of conventional power that they are selling. This would apply to countries that use a feed-in tariff to pay for renewable power.

  • Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

    We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.

  • A game-theoretic analysis of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

    We address the problem of spectrum sharing with spectrum pricing where the primary user wants to sell the spectrum to the secondary users in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). By equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the players in the spectrum sharing game aims to take the strategy to maximize its own profit under sojourn-time constraint for secondary users. In condition of spectrum sojourn-time is limited because of primary user's channel usage pattern each of spectrum providers will choose different strategy to increase profit more. With the Bertrand model we analyze the impacts of several secondary users' preference to spectrum product provided by primary user. (i.e., channel quality, spectrum substitutability and sojourn-time).

  • Mobile Virtual Network Operators/Second Brands

    The reason forMVNOto exist is to increase the number of players in the mobile services ecosystem. They are not needed for any technical reason, as they do not own or operate an exclusive piece of technology or get a license to use scarce resources. There are very high entry barriers for new companies to enter into the Mobile Network Operators arena (MNOs) that effectively limit the number of players who may operate in a given area: Mobile Network Operators need frequencies to operate on and the spectrum is limited; the second entry barrier consists in the very big investment needed to build a new greenfield network in a given country.TheMVNOecosystem is composed of two groups of companies: the many different flavors ofMVNOs, FullMVNO, Service Providers and Branded Resellers; and a small group of other players who support theMVNOs in some of their functions, known asMVNAs (Mobile Virtual Network Operator Aggregator),MVNEs(Mobile Virtual Network Operator Enablers), and Technology Enablers.

  • Generalized quantity competition for multiple products and loss of efficiency

    In this paper we study a generalized model for quantity (Cournot) oligopolistic competition. The main goal in this paper is to understand Cournot competition when firms are producing multiple differentiated products and are faced with a variety of constraints. We first study existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibria under general constraints. The main focus of the paper is to compare the total society surplus and the total firms' profit under Cournot competition to the corresponding total surplus and total profit of the firms under a centralized setting, (i.e., when a single firm controls all the products in the market maximizing total surplus or total profit respectively). Our goal is to understand how the presence of competition affects the overall society (that includes firms and consumers) as well as the overall firms' profit in the system, but also determine what the key drivers of the inefficiencies that arise due to competition are.

  • Investigation of Gencos’ optimal bidding strategies in oligopolistic power markets

    In electricity market with system constraints and limited number of producers, Generation companies (Gencos) are facing an oligopolistic competition market rather than full competitive market. In this market each Genco can increase its own profit through strategic bidding. This paper investigates the problem of developing optimal bidding strategies of Gencos considering participants' different behaviours and transmission constraints. The problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization that considers Gencos' profits and system dispatch as well. The objective of proposed optimization model is to generate optimal bidding strategies for Gencos, while satisfying transmission constraints. Impact of optimal bidding strategies of Gencos on system nodal prices and corresponding payoffs are studied. Furthermore effect of exercising market power due to irrational bidding of strategic generators on system Nash equilibrium point is presented. Finally IEEE-30 bus test system is used for case study to demonstrate simulation results.

  • A supply chain network oligopoly model with random demands

    In this paper, we develop a model of supply chain network under oligopolistic competition, where the demands associated with the demand markers are random. The supply chain network is consisted of oligopolistic firms that compete non- cooperatively, and all the firms try to determine their product flows to maximize their profits. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium conditions are solved by using variational inequality. Finally, we illustrate the efficiency of the model by two numerical examples, for which the equilibrium prices and product shipments are computed.



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